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Extended abstract:
Education has long been considered a multipurpose policy tool. A related belief is that increased
educational attainment will lead to less wage inequality. Consequently, given the current situation
of increasing inequality in most developed societies, of which globalisation is a much-cited
culprit, policy-makers have been very keen to demand further public funding for schooling.
However, it might be the case that such an approach proves ineffective. For instance, if education
systems are poorly designed, former students may not benefit financially –at the labour market–
from the qualifications they acquired at schools. Another possibility is that ability interacts
powerfully with schooling, which would imply that a more educated workforce would be
associated with more wage inequality.
In this paper, we study this topic –the link between education and inequality– which we find
crucial for Western societies. We start by putting forward three channels whereby education
impacts upon inequality: inter- and intra-educational-levels (between- and within-educational-
levels) earnings differentials and changes in the distribution of schooling.
We focus on within-educational-levels earnings differentials and suggest that quantile
regressions should be used for uncovering them. Quantile regressions allow for different impacts
of education along the whole conditional distribution of earnings, unlike the more common
Ordinary Least Squares estimates, which focus on mean returns.
In the empirical sections, we compare quantile regression results of returns to education based on
Mincer regressions from fifteen European countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and
the United Kingdom).  Each country is covered by approximately a 15-year time-span (between
1980 and 1995).
Four contrasting patterns emerge:
1) an increasingly positive role of education upon intra-educational-levels inequality, where
the best (worst) paid at each educational level reap higher (lower) benefits from education
and where such a best-worst differential has increased over time (Portugal);
2) a positive but stable relationship between education and within-levels inequality (Austria,
Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK);
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3) a neutral impact of education upon within-levels inequality, as there are no sizeable
differences in returns to education across the wage distribution (Denmark and Italy); and
4) a negative relationship between returns to education and the wage distribution (Germany
and Greece).
These results, which provide a summary assessment of the outcome of the interaction between
education systems and labour-market institutions, suggest that, in most countries, the dispersion
in earnings increases with educational levels. This is the case in eleven out of fifteen countries,
whereas in two countries the dispersion of earnings proves stable across different educational
levels and in two others earnings are less dispersed for higher educational levels. Given this
evidence, and in the context of within-levels inequality, we conclude that education does not
reduce wage inequality.
Moreover, if we assume that such characteristics can be proxied by ability then our results say
that there is a positive interaction between ability and education: the higher the ability level, the
stronger will the impact of schooling be on one’s wages. This result supports ‘Bell curve’ type of
arguments which place much emphasis on the role of cognitive ability on economic and social
success.
These results also suggest that education is a risky investment. To the extent that prospective
students are unaware of the characteristics which will place them at some point along a wide
earnings distribution, the financial outcome of their education decision is largely unpredictable.
This situation might also correspond to over-education, in the sense that the marginal reward
some individuals reap from their schooling is very low or even negative. Such individuals will
thus not benefit financially from the costly investments they engage in. Standard OLS returns
thus disregard an enormous amount of variety in returns which is underlying the data from most
countries. This also implies that drawing on simple OLS returns for policy-making might prove
rather elusive and misleading.
In terms of policy-making, we believe that these overall results are useful as they amount to a
summary, ex-post characterisation of the joint functioning of each country’s national education
system and labour-market institutions. Should wage equality be considered as a policy goal, a




Education has long been considered a multipurpose policy tool. One of the goals customarily
attached to education policy is that increased educational attainment will lead to less wage
inequality. Consequently, and given the current situation of increasing inequality in most
developed societies,3,4 policy-makers have been very keen to demand and support further public
funding for schooling activities.5
More importantly still, many see education as the only tool available for governments to reverse
or, at least, slow down the inequality-enhancing impact attributed to globalisation. In fact,
regardless of the explanation we choose for such impact of globalisation upon inequality –either
trade or technology6-, the element of skills is always crucial and must therefore be at the heart of
the rise in inequality witnessed in most developed countries.7
However, and contrary to this more common approach, one might also very well think of a
number of situations where increasing educational attainment will lead to higher, not lower,
earnings inequality. Two examples should suffice: 1) poorly designed or outdated education
systems, where students are provided with skills in large supply and little demand in the labour
market; and 2) elitist educational systems, where some schools which accept only a few
candidates (not necessarily the most talented) concentrate all the job-market signalling that
prospective employers are interested in.
More fundamentally, ability might play a more important role in terms of the worker’s
productivity (and pay) at higher educational levels. In fact, if there is a powerful interaction
                                          
3 See OECD (1995) and Table 1.1. It is very clear that the majority of the OECD countries covered have witnessed
increasing income inequality during the 1980’s. Although, there is no evidence on the evolution of inequality during
the early 1990’s, for most countries we find no reasons to assume that this pattern has changed.
4 There is a wealth of US-based literature on this issue: among others, see Lee (1999), Gottschalk (1997), Blau and
Kahn (1996), Juhn et al. (1993) and Katz and Murphy (1992). For Europe, see Leuven et al. (1997). A more
comprehensive and international work is Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997). Finally, a thorough and recent general
reference on inequality can be found in Champernowne and Cowell (1998).
5 See the recent speech of the Portuguese minister of education at a UNESCO conference -Oliveira Martins (1999).
6 Trade with less-developed countries in goods which are intensive in unskilled labour would, the argument goes,
create a downward pressure on the earnings of the unskilled labour force of the developed countries. On the other
hand, technological progress would make those workers who are less able to interact with such new technologies less
appealing in the labour market. Consequently, their earnings would either fall or increase less than those of the
skilled labour force.
7 We follow the standard view of regarding inequality as bad. See Welch (1999) for a contrasting, non-mainstream
approach.
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between education and ability, the current process of rising educational attainment would lead,
per se, to further earnings dispersion.8 If ability interacts powerfully with schooling, a more
educated workforce would be associated with more wage inequality.
In this context of conflicting a priori evidence, we believe that it is of the utmost importance to
assess empirically the direction of the effective impact of education upon inequality. If education
proves to be, after all, a less appealing policy tool in terms of reducing inequality, then the huge
investments currently being made should be placed under scrutiny. It might very well be the case
that alternative applications of public funds are more effective for placing each society at its
preferred situation in terms of the efficiency-equity trade-off boundaries.9
Moreover, given the very diverse situation across European countries in terms of both their
educational and labour-market institutions –which are those most likely to shape the wage
distribution and, thus, wage inequality– one could expect that such a link between education and
inequality would adopt different patterns. This aspect could prove rather insightful and
informative in the sense that it would suggest different country models to be followed according
to the goals in mind.
Given this background, we draw on quantile regression results of Mincer equations from fifteen
European countries in order to address the link between education and inequality. Quantile
regressions are a technique that allows one to differentiate the contribution of regressors along the
distribution of the endogenous variable and not simply at the mean, as with OLS.
We use this feature to assess any differences in terms of the rewards to education for individuals
from different portions of the wage distribution and thus conclude on the link between education
and inequality. Simultaneously, we provide evidence to answer Card’s (1994) question ‘Is the
labour force reasonably well-described by a constant return to education for all workers?’ [page
33, author’s italics].
                                          
8 See OECD (1997) for a survey of recent developments in schooling attainment.
9 See Heckman (1999) for a very insightful analysis and evaluation of policy experiments in education in the United
States and also an example of the need to assess the effectiveness of education policies. This author suggests that a
dislocation of investment from upper to lower educational levels is in need. He argues that as ‘learning begets
learnings’, improving the access and quality of education at early ages will have a strong effect on the individual’s
life-long prospects.
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Our paper goes as follows: in Section 2, a brief presentation of the econometric theory behind
quantile regressions is offered. In Section 3, we explain how we use such results to draw
conclusions in terms of the (different) impact education might have upon inequality across
Europe. Section 4 presents the data-sets used in each country, together with some descriptive
statistics. In the following section we compare the differences that emerge among the countries
surveyed in terms of returns to years of education. Finally, Section 6 presents a brief summary of
the paper and concludes.
2. Quantile regressions
‘“On the average” has never been a satisfactory statement with which to
conclude a study on heterogeneous populations. Characterisation of the
conditional mean constitutes only a limited aspect of possibly more
extensive changes involving the entire distribution.’
Buchinsky (1994, page 453)10
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is based on the mean of the conditional distribution of
the regression’s dependent variable. This approach is used because one implicitly assumes that
possible differences in terms of the impact of the exogenous variables along the conditional
distribution are unimportant.
However, this may prove inadequate in some research agendas. If exogenous variables influence
parameters of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable other than the mean, then an
analysis which disregards this possibility will be severely weakened (see Koenker and Bassett,
1978). Unlike OLS, quantile regression models allow for a full characterisation of the conditional
distribution of the dependent variable.11,12
                                          
10 An alternative quote might be taken from Mosteler and Tukey, 1977, p. 266, quoted in Mata and Machado (1996):
“What the regression curve does is give a grand summary for the averages of the distributions corresponding to the
set of x’s. […] Just as the mean gives an incomplete picture of a single distribution, so the regression curve gives a
correspondingly incomplete picture for a set of distributions”.
11 If the dependent variable is distributed identically around a known function of the regressors, then the distribution
of y given x is a translation family. If one ‘connects’ the different averages of the conditional distribution for
different values of x, one gets the mean or OLS regression. One might also connect the points associated with
different quantiles of the distribution of y given x for different values of x, thus getting regression quantiles, and all
these regressions would be parallel. The information about the impact of different regressors on different measures of
localisation would then be the same. However, in most cases, the distribution of y given x is not a translation family.
In these cases, different regressions provide different results concerning the way y varies with x. Quantile regressions
allow for this to be done, as they may characterise the entire conditional distribution of the dependent variable. It is
usually the case that there are information gains from estimating more regressions than simply the mean regression.
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The quantile regression model can be written as (see Buchinsky (1994)):
(1) θθθθ ββ iiiiii xxwuxw =+= )(lnQuantwithln
where ix  is the vector of exogenous variables and θβ  is the vector of parameters. )(lnQuant xwθ
denotes the θ th conditional quantile of wln  given x . The θ th regression quantile, 10 <<θ , is

































where )(ερθ is the check function defined as θεερθ =)(  if 0≥ε  or εθερθ )1()( −=  if
0<ε .13
This problem does not have an explicit form but can be solved by linear programming methods.
Standard errors are obtainable by bootstrap methods.
The least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator of β is a particular case within this framework. This
is obtained by setting θ=0.5 (the median regression). The first quartile is obtained by setting
θ=0.25 and so on. As one increases θ from 0 to 1, one traces the entire distribution of y,
conditional on x.
We provide a simple example of the usefulness of quantile regressions by considering gender
wage differentials in Portugal. We draw on a 1995 sample from Quadros de Pessoal, a rich
                                                                                                                                        
12 See Abadie et al (1999) for a recent extension of quantile regressions, considering instrumental variables.
13 This procedure is basically an extension of the method used for computing simple quantiles of a distribution.
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employer-based data-set14 and run a simple OLS regression of log hourly earnings on a constant
and a dummy, taking value one for women and value zero for men:
(4) iii ufemalehw ++= .)/ln( βα
In this very simple setting, the coefficient associated with this dummy variable can be interpreted
as the average pay differential between men and women. Our result (see last row of Table 2.2)
indicates that such a differential is -0.27.
However, should one analyse the distributions of earnings for men and women, one realises that
the shape of the distributions is very different (see Graph 2.1). For instance, we notice (see Table
2.1) that women’s hourly wages peak at the 5.84 and 5.88 classes, with a 5.7% frequency, while
the corresponding class for men is 6.2, with only a 4.1% frequency.  In Table 2.2 we realise that
the gender difference in earnings increases substantially as one moves upward in the deciles of
each distribution. While the difference of average hourly wages for the lower 10% of each
distribution is –0.058, this figure increases to –0.288 at the fifth class, reaching –0.323 for the last
income class.
This succinct analysis shows very clearly that gender differences in earnings go well beyond the
fact that men, on average, earn more than women. However, should one consider this issue by
simply drawing on OLS estimates, much information contained in the data would be lost. We run
an OLS regression for our data and obtained a coefficient of –0.27.
Quantile regressions, on the other hand, enable one to better understand how the two distributions
differ. Effectively, the same dummy coefficient, when resulting from this latter type of
regression, mimics the differences in pay at different points of the wage distribution. It increases
from –0.099 for the first decile, increasing to –0.3 at the median and –0.315 at the top decile.
Summing up, quantile regressions provide snap-shots of different points of a conditional
distribution. They therefore constitute a parsimonious way of describing the whole distribution
and should bring much value-added if the relationship between the regressors and the
independent variable evolves across its conditional distribution. Given the discussion in Section
                                          
14 All firms operating in Portugal are required to fill in a table with extensive information on each worker and on the
firm itself. This requirement has been in force since the early 1980’s, thus providing an excellent source of
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1, namely the suggestion that education might be impacting very differently across the wage
distribution, we employ this methodology for the education-earnings relationship.15,16
3. Decomposing education-related inequality
We consider three channels through which education might influence wage inequality: within-
and between-levels inequality and changes in the schooling distribution. The first channel is due
to the differences in mean earnings associated with individuals having different educational
levels. Such differences are deeply related to OLS returns to education.
The second channel, within-levels, inequality, has to do with the different degree of dispersion of
earnings at each educational level. This channel is better depicted by quantile regressions as we
will show below. This is also the link upon which we focus throughout the paper.
Finally, changes in the distribution of schooling should also be acknowledged as a link between
education and inequality. If the labour force is getting more educated (due either to life-long
training or, more importantly, to the increasing educational attainment of new cohorts) then the
overall level of inequality should also be affected.
Bearing this framework in mind, we distinguish between three possible situations concerning the
impact of education upon inequality. These three cases concern only within-levels inequality. In a
first situation we consider equal returns across the wage distribution. This would mean that such
distributions are identical for all educational levels.
The only difference lies in their position, as they get shifted further to the right (higher mean
wages) as the educational level is higher. In this case, education could not be associated with
                                                                                                                                        
information for labour-market oriented research. See Section 4 for more information on this dataset.
15 This methodology proved fruitful in previous similar analyses, namely Machado and Mata (1998) and Hartog et al.
(1999) –for Portugal–, Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (1999) –for Austria– and Garcia et al. (1997) –for Spain.
16 We assume throughout the paper that the nature of the link between schooling and earnings is a causal one. While
theoretically one might certainly point out that schooling is not an exogenous regressor in Mincer equations,
empirical results suggest that the extent of the bias in education coefficients is small –see Card (1999). See also the
Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) literature (Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Ichino and Winter-Ebmer
(1999)) for a more careful analysis of causality in economic events in general and the education-earnings relationship
in particular.
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within-levels inequality given that the dispersion of the different conditional wage distributions is
always the same.
A second case occurs when returns to education increase as one moves upward in the wage
distribution. As the next section will show, this is the most common case across our sample of
European countries. This would mean that wage distributions which depend on progressively
higher educational levels are more disperse.17 Here, schooling would have a positive impact upon
wage inequality.
Thirdly, the final possible case is that returns to education fall as one considers higher quantiles.
Unlike the situations before, intra-education inequality would decrease (as wage distributions
conditional on higher educational levels are less disperse).
In a nutshell, our procedure for linking education with earnings inequality involves decomposing
the contribution of the first upon the second into three effects: intra-education and inter-education
inequality and the distribution changes. The first refers to the progression of the dispersion of
conditional distributions of earnings: for instance, if such distributions ‘shrink’, then this
component’s contribution is negative (i.e. decreases inequality).
The second effect refers to the extent of the rightward shifts in such distributions as we move
upward in the educational levels. This is closely associated with the size of returns to education.
Finally, the third effect deals with changes in the educational attainment of the labour force.
As the second effect should always be positive (because returns to education have always been
positive so far), the first effect, intra-education inequality (which is associated with the slope of
the returns-deciles relationship as derived from regression quantiles) either reinforces or weakens
(and eventually reverses) the second effect. If one disregards the third effect, an asymmetry
would arise: while a positively-sloped returns-deciles relationship is a sufficient condition for
concluding that education contributes positively to inequality, a negatively-sloped curve is only a
necessary condition for concluding that education contributes negatively to inequality.
                                          
17 In econometric terms, this would be interpreted as evidence of heteroskedasticity. In fact, quantile regressions are
also used for tests of such non-spherical disturbances (see Koenker and Bassett (1982)).
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Throughout the remaining chapters we will focus on the returns-deciles relationship drawing on
data from fifteen European countries.
4. Data-sets description
The results for each country were derived from a specific data-set used by each country’s team.
Table 4.1 describes such data-sets, including a short characterisation of its nature, the years
covered, the number of observations used for each year and also a reference on the procedure
adopted for dropping outlier observations.
Most data-sets are household surveys. Some countries have used labour-market oriented surveys
(Denmark, France and Switzerland) and an employer-based data-set (Portugal). The number of
observations used varies a great deal, ranging from fewer than 2,000 (Finland, Norway and
Sweden) to more than 25,000 (Portugal and Spain –for 1995).
There is also some variation in terms of the procedure for dealing with potential outliers. Some
countries dropped observations whose wages were below their minimum wage or social security
contribution levels (France and Austria), while others used all information (Denmark).
Switzerland trimmed its data-sets by dropping 0.5% of the observations at each end of the wages
distribution. Most countries dropped observations with zero earnings (and zero hours worked).
These differences should be understood bearing in mind the different nature of the data-sets and
the different degrees to which the data-sets were ‘ready to use’ when made available to the
research teams.
The years for which a country snap-shot is available are centred around 1980, 1985, 1990 and
1995 (see Table 4.2). However, there are still some differences in the length of the coverage,
ranging from a 24-year period in the case of French results (1970-1993) and six years for Spain
(1990-1995). There are also some countries for which data is available only from the late 1980’s
onward (Finland and Ireland) or for the 1990’s (Spain and Switzerland).
Table 4.3 provides descriptive statistics for each data-set/year used in the empirical part of the
paper. An important observation which is to be found is the increasing schooling attainment of
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the working populations across the countries surveyed.18 Moreover, all countries have averages of
at least 10 years of schooling. The exception is Portugal, with figures substantially lower (from
4.9 to 6.5 years of schooling). Switzerland, Ireland, Netherlands, UK and Denmark boast the
highest averages (12 of more years of schooling in 1995). Aside from Portugal, Italy, Greece and
Spain have the lowest figures, reaching a maximum of 10 years in the last year.
Average experience has followed a less consistent path, as it is seen to decrease in some countries
(Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal and UK) and increase in others (Denmark, Finland, Ireland and
Switzerland). There seems to be some convergence process, as the former countries are those
with high average experience levels (more than 20 years) while the latter have the low figures
(less than 20 years).
Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations of log wages and three deciles of wages) are
also reported for the dependent variable used by each country. These are gross for all countries
except Austria, Greece and Italy, which use net figures. Comparisons, either within or between
countries, are difficult on account of the differences in currencies and inflation rates.19
Table 4.4 draws on these last data to present two inequality measures: the ratio between the
different deciles of total earnings distribution and the difference between the 9th and 1st deciles of
the log earnings distribution. Concerning the ratio between the 9th and the 1st deciles of the
earnings distribution, most countries exhibit values between 2 and 2.5. There are a few
exceptions however, most notably Ireland (3.68 in 1987 and 4.74 in 1994), Portugal (increasing
from 3.46 in 1982 to 4.58 in 1995).20 Sweden, in 1981, and Norway, in 1991, are the only
countries having figures below 2 (1.97 and 1.99, respectively).21
As to the time trend displayed by the figures, we see that, for both measures and for every
country except France, inequality increases.22 Although time periods are somewhat different, we
                                          
18 The exception is Spain, between 1994 and 1995, but one should bear in mind that the data-sets used in each year
are different
19 France is an exception, as its wages were computed at constant prices.
20 Spain (from 3.26 in 1990 to 3.94 in 1995) and the UK (from 2.58 in 1980 to 3.33 in 1995) also boast high
inequality figures.
21 The log ratio measure provides the same results in terms of the direction of change.
22 This also applies to Italy between 1980 and 1984 and to Switzerland between 1995 and 1998.
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find these results to be in line with those of Table 1.1.23 It is interesting to note the positive
correlation between schooling attainment and inequality.
5. Empirical results
In this section we present the results obtained for fifteen European countries. Following this, we
offer an assessment of the different situations we find in terms of the link between education and
inequality. It will be seen that the overall panorama of this link is very diverse across these
countries.24




21 exp.exp..log θθθθ δδβα ,
where i = 1, …, N (N being the number of observations for each year), θ = .1, .2, …, .9 is the
quantile being analysed, yh is the hourly gross wage,26 educ is the number of schooling years27
and exp corresponds to Mincer experience (age minus schooling minus school starting age). Only
men working full time (35 hours or more per week) were considered.28 Each country was
considered in four separate years, which were as close as possible to 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995.
Below we provide a summary description29 of each country’s results:
Austria (Graph 5.1): lower quantiles are associated with lower returns to education; overall
returns are falling; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship has changed somewhat, as returns to
lower quantiles have fallen while those of higher quantiles have remained unaltered.
                                          
23 The only clear exception is Portugal, for which we notice a clear rise in inequality, while Table 1.1 suggests that
there were no significant differences in that period. This is due to the fact that Table 1.1 focuses on income, not
wage, inequality. Rodrigues (1994), who decomposes income inequality into different sources, finds that if one were
to concentrate only on gross wages, one would find rising inequality.
24 See Asplund and Pereira (1999) for an extensive survey of recent research in returns to education across Europe.
25 This was also the version adopted throughout in the PuRE project.
26 Results from Austria draw on net wages.
27 For most countries only information on the highest level achieved was available. Extra school attainment above the
school years associated with the degree are disregarded.
28 The situation for women was disregarded on account of the extra complication of potential selectivity biases.
29 The complete results are displayed in Table 5.1.
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Denmark (Graph 5.2): lower quantiles are only moderately associated with lower returns to
education (especially for 1982 and 1995); overall returns are increasing; the slope of
returns/quantiles relationship has not changed – there is a parallel upward shift of the curve.30
Finland (Graph 5.3): upper quantiles are associated with higher returns to education; overall
returns are falling; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship has remained unchanged.
France (Graph 5.4): lower quantiles are associated with lower returns to education; overall
returns are falling; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship has not changed –there is a parallel
downward shift of the curve.
Germany (Graph 5.5): lower quantiles are associated with higher returns to education; overall
returns are increasing; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship has remained stable.
Greece (Graph 5.6): lower quantiles are associated with higher returns to education; overall
returns are decreasing; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship has become slightly steeper as
returns to the lower deciles have increased more than have those of the higher deciles.
Ireland (Graph 5.7): lower quantiles are associated with lower returns to education, although this
is not very clear for 1987; overall returns are falling; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship
has changed slightly as returns to the bottom deciles have fallen by more than have those of the
higher deciles.
Italy (Graph 5.8): upper and lower quantiles are similar; returns exhibit a u-shaped pattern;
overall returns are increasing; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship has remained stable.
Netherlands (Graph 5.9): lower quantiles are associated with lower returns to education; overall
returns are falling; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship has not changed significantly –there
is a parallel downward shift of the curve, except for a stronger decrease at lower deciles.
                                          
30 The comparison between 1982 and 1986 is insightful in terms of the extra information provided by quantile
regressions. Although median returns are the same in both years, returns in 1986 prove to be more disperse than in
1982.
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Norway (Graph 5.10): lower quantiles are associated with lower returns to education; overall
returns are increasing; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship has not changed significantly –
there is a parallel upward shift of the curve.
Portugal (Graph 5.11): lower quantiles are associated to lower returns to education; overall
returns are increasing; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship has changed markedly –returns
to lower quantiles have fallen while returns to upper quantiles have increased.
Spain (Graph 5.12): lower quantiles are associated to lower returns to education; overall returns
are increasing; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship has not changed –there is a parallel
upward shift of the curve.
Sweden (Graph 5.13): upper quantiles are clearly associated with higher returns to education;
overall returns are decreasing; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship has changed slightly –
returns to lower quantiles have fallen slightly more than have returns to upper quantiles; returns
to lower quantiles are particularly low (2%-3%).
Switzerland (Graph 5.14): upper quantiles are associated with higher returns to education;
overall returns fall slightly; the slope of returns/quantiles relationship has changed slightly –
returns to upper quantiles have remained stable while those of lower quantiles have fallen.
United Kingdom (Graph 5.15): upper quantiles are associated with higher returns to education;
overall returns are increasing; the slope of the returns/quantiles relationship has remained stable.
We present in Table 5.2 and Graph 5.16 the returns to education (in percentage terms) for the
lower and top deciles and for the first and last year considered by each country (approximately
1980 and 1995, although there are a few exceptions). It can be seen that returns differ greatly
across the fifteen countries surveyed (and the 15-year period considered). They range between
12.6% (Portugal, 1995) and 4.1% (Sweden, 1995).
Considering as a threshold between large and small an 8% return, the high-return countries are
Austria, Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Switzerland, while the low-return countries are Denmark,
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France, Greece, Italy, Norway and Sweden.31 There is thus some evidence of convergence in
returns to education as returns to high-return countries have been falling, whereas the opposite
occurs for low-return countries.32,33
Some results obtained from the quantile regressions run for each country are presented in Table
5.3. The first column presents the difference between OLS returns to education estimates at those
years. The panorama here is very diverse: Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal and the UK
have increasing returns, while Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland have
falling returns. The greatest increase is Italy (2.1%) while the biggest fall is Ireland (-2.7%).
There might be some convergence phenomenon as the high-return countries see such returns fall
while the opposite occurs for the low-return countries. The exceptions in this process are Sweden
and Portugal.
The following two columns refer to the differences in returns to education for the same quantiles
between 1980 and 1995. Column 2 [Q(.1|95)-Q(.1|80)], which considers returns to the first decile,
measures how different the pay-off to education for the low-earnings individuals became in the
15-year period under consideration. Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and
Switzerland have negative figures here. This result suggests that, for these seven countries, the
role of education for the less attractive to the labour market has been eroded during the last two
decades. Moreover, it is insightful to compare the evolution of returns at the mean (OLS) and at
the first decile (QR) and notice that, in most countries (the exceptions are Finland, France, Italy
and the UK), the former returns (OLS) always exceed the latter.
The same computations (the difference between 1995 and 1980 results) were applied to the top
quantile (column 3). Here we find negative figures for Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Sweden and Switzerland. This means that, in these countries, returns to education have fallen
across those individuals who reap the highest earnings at each educational level. On the other
hand, if we compare columns 2 and 3, we see that returns to the bottom quantile have fallen by
more (or increased by less) than their top quantile counterparts in all countries except for France,
Germany, Italy and the UK. This means that, for the majority of countries, the downward
(upward) pressure in returns to education at the bottom quantile is stronger (weaker) than at the
                                          
31 Netherlands, Spain and the UK have values above or below this threshold depending on the year considered.
32 The only exceptions are Portugal and Sweden.
33 See the last rows of table 5.2 where the coefficient of variation of OLS returns falls from 0.31 to 0.26 from the first
to the last years considered.
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top quantile. Moreover, with respect to the evolution of OLS and Quantile Regressions returns,
returns at the ninth decile have increased by more (or decreased by less) than those at the mean in
every country (except Denmark and France).
In columns 4 and 5, we compare different quantiles in the same year (and not the same quantiles
in different years, as before). Except for Germany and Greece, the return for the top quantile is
always larger than the return for the lower quantile. Moreover, taking into account column 5, we
see that the difference in returns across the earnings distribution is always higher in 1995 than in
1980 (except for France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the UK).34 This means that the different role
of education upon wages across the wage distribution has become more acute, in the sense that
the richer (at each educational level) are benefiting increasingly more from it than the poorer. We
may thus conclude that, in some European countries, returns to education have fanned out.
Following upon this, one must conclude that these fifteen countries exhibit different situations.
However, a few similarities among them may be found and used in order to draw the countries
together into some specific types.
Bearing these results in mind, we defined four groups of countries –see Table 5.3. In the first
group, which includes only Portugal, returns increase markedly along the conditional wage
distribution and this trend has become more pronounced in recent years. Moreover, the returns to
the top deciles have been increasing while the opposite has taken place for the bottom deciles.
Not only is the role of education increasingly more important for the top deciles, for the bottom
deciles the importance of that role has fallen in the 15-year period covered.
Our second type is formed with Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. As mentioned above, returns in these countries increase with
the wage distribution. However, and contrary to the previous type, there has been no clear
increase in dispersion going on: the slope of the returns-deciles curve has not changed
significantly.35,36 Therefore, although education also contributes to further inequality in this set of
countries, its influence has not been increasing as clearly as in the previous group.
                                          
34 Portugal is the most extreme case as such difference more than doubles, jumping from 3.7% to 8.9%.
35 This conclusion does not fully apply to Austria and Sweden, where we see falling returns for those at the lower
deciles while returns to upper quantiles remain unaltered. These two countries could also be placed in the first
category.
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In the third group, Denmark and Italy, returns are approximately the same along the conditional
wage distribution. This means that, in Denmark and Italy, the educational impact on inequality
should be light, as only the effect of inter-education inequality (related to positive returns to
education) is present.
Finally, in a fourth type made up of Germany and Greece, we observe higher returns for those at
the bottom deciles of the conditional earnings distribution –the slope of the returns-quantiles
relationship is negative. This contrasts with the previous three situations, where the relationship
was clearly positive (or horizontal). Education, in these countries, reduces intra-education
inequality, as the contribution of education upon the less labour-market attractive is stronger than
upon the most attractive. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 3, it may happen that the inter-
education inequality effect dominates, thus resulting in an overall positive effect of education
upon inequality.37
It should also be mentioned that out of the four countries which do not follow the predominant
pattern of increasing returns in the conditional distribution, the results for two of them (Italy and
Greece) are based on net wages. This should result in a less steep returns-quantiles profile as
progressive taxes should contribute to smoothing returns at higher quantiles.
The overall information present here is summarised in Graph 5.17. Here we restrict our analysis
to the situations facing each country in 1980 and 1995 (or the closest years available). On the x-
axis we consider returns to the first decile, while the y-axis depicts returns to the ninth decile.
Each point corresponds to the case of each country in one of such years. Results for each country
are then connected and a small arrow indicates the direction of the ‘movement’, from the
beginning of the 1980’s until the mid-1990’s.38
A 45º-degree line was also included, representing the loci where point estimates of the returns to
the first decile and to the ninth decile are equal. This line also separates the graph in two halves.
The top, left-hand-side part includes those countries whose returns to education are higher for the
                                                                                                                                        
36 This situation corresponds to the case of the USA –see Buchinsky (1994).
37 See Tsakloglou and Antoninis (1999) for an analysis of the impact of public education upon inequality in Greece.
The authors conclude that such impact is negative, especially in terms of the primary and secondary levels. Their
approach is very different from the one taken in this paper, as they focus on education-related government transfers
to households, and not on  education-related wage income.
38 When the years were three or more years different from these, the true years were inserted next to the
corresponding point.
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highest decile than for the lowest.39 All countries surveyed can be found in this sub-set, except for
Germany40 and Greece. Denmark and Italy are also close enough to the border that each country’s
returns at each year are statistically equal.41
All the remaining countries, which in the previous classification were placed in the first two
groups, can be found in the upper left part of the graph. These countries thus have returns to
education which are higher for the top deciles than for the lower deciles.
Another piece of information displayed in this graph is the trend in returns to education at each
extreme of the distribution of earnings. Positively-sloped segments correspond to situations
where the returns to both the ninth and the first decile are moving in the same way, either
increasing or falling. This is the case of all countries, except for Austria, France and Portugal. For
these three countries returns at different parts of the distribution are moving in opposite
directions.42
However, differences in France are not statistically significant, while in Austria only the returns
to the first deciles are statistically different. This leaves us with Portugal as the only country
where returns at each end of the distribution are moving in opposite ways. The returns at opposite
quantiles of the distribution are diverging because the lowest returns (for the bottom decile) are
falling, while the higher returns (to the highest decile) are getting even higher.43
An interesting way to interpret these overall results is to assume that the only unobserved variable
is ability (or motivation) and the education decision is exogenous (not influenced by ability). If
this were so, then an OLS regression would produce returns to education for individuals with
mean unobserved ability. On the other hand, the results from quantile regressions provide
estimates for returns to education for individuals at different percentiles of the ability distribution.
                                          
39 The threshold for statistical difference of point estimates adopted was one standard deviation.
40 Results for the first period (1984) are not statistically different, however. In this year returns to the lowest quantile
were not significantly higher than those of the highest quantile.
41 This is not true for Denmark in 1995, when returns to the top quantile are higher than returns to the lower quantile.
We opted to include this country in this sub-set as the difference is small and the situation applies for 1980.
42 The returns for Finland and Sweden (only for the ninth decile) are also not significantly different.
43 It could be argued that Austria should also be included in the first group, as the returns/deciles relationship is not
positively sloped as for the second group countries. However, since the relationship is not significantly negatively
shaped, we opted for classifying Austria as we did.
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To the extent that this assumption holds, the contrasting results obtained must be explained by
differences in the way that the education system and/or the labour market of each country deal
with individuals with different abilities or by differences in the degree of interaction between
schooling and ability. It is then the case that in countries of the third and fourth types (zero- and
negatively-sloped returns-deciles curves) the functioning of such institutions44 compensates for
the lower ability of some individuals so that there is no such interaction.
On the other hand, such mechanisms are not in place in countries of the first and second types
(positively-sloped returns-deciles curves), who represent a overwhelming majority in our
sample.45 In this case, and given the assumptions above, there is a positive interaction between
schooling and ability, whereby schooling exacerbates ability-related differences. This is a result
in line with those of ‘The Bell curve’ (Herrnstein and Murray (1995)) where cognitive ability is
seen as the main force explaining social and economic differences.
6. Conclusions
The link between education and inequality is tackled in this paper by considering results from
quantile regressions of Mincer/wage equations from fifteen European countries across an
approximately fifteen-year period (from 1980 until 1995).
We use this methodology after decomposing the effect of education upon inequality in three
terms: inequality due to within- and to between-educational-levels earnings differentials (prices)
and to changes in the distribution of schooling (quantities). The first term is associated with the
positive returns to education which entail that, on average, more educated individuals earn more,
while the second term deals with the different dispersions of conditional distributions of earnings
across different educational levels.
By running Mincer equations with the quantiles regression technique, we perceived four different
situations. The first case was that of Portugal, where not only do returns increase with the
quantiles of the conditional earnings distribution, but the relationship has become more acute
                                          
44 The above-mentioned institutions might comprise specific wage-bargaining systems, special training or vocational
systems at the upper secondary level and minimum wage laws.
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over time.  This suggests a positive and increasing impact of education upon inequality, in the
sense that within-levels inequality exists and has been increasing.
In a second case (Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the UK) a positive but stable relationship was found.  The third group included
Denmark and Italy, for whom returns are very similar across the distribution, a result which
means that education has neither increased nor decreased inequality. Finally, in a fourth case,
Germany and Greece, the returns-quantiles profile is negative, which suggests that, as far as
within-levels inequality is concerned, education reduces inequality.
Overall, these international differences provide a summary assessment of the outcome of the
interaction between education systems and labour-market institutions in each country in terms of
wage inequality. Our results prove that such a process works differently across the fifteen-country
sample of European countries considered.
However, for a majority of such countries (Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK), one sees very clearly that the
dispersion in earnings increases with the educational levels. In these countries difficult-to-
measure individual-specific characteristics (e.g., motivation or ability) play a larger role in
earnings than in the remaining countries.
If we assume that such characteristics can be proxied by ability then our results say that there is a
positive interaction between ability and education: the higher the ability level, the stronger will
the impact of schooling be on one’s wages. This result supports ‘Bell curve’ type of arguments
which place much emphasis on the role of cognitive ability on economic and social success.
On the other hand, to the extent that prospective students are unaware of their own endowments
of such characteristics, this result implies that the risk associated with educational investments is
greater in those countries. This is also associated with over-education, in the sense that the
marginal reward some individuals reap from their schooling is very low or even negative.
                                                                                                                                        
45 A possible explanation of these results is that there is some interaction between experience and education which
takes place at higher wages. This possibility was tested in the case of Portugal but no evidence was found to support
it.
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In terms of policy-making, these overall results should be useful as they amount to a summary
characterisation of the joint functioning of each country’s national education system and labour-
market institutions. Should wage equality be considered to be a political goal, a country where
such joint mechanism promotes inequality might wish, on both efficiency and equity grounds, to
pinpoint and reverse the underlying causes.
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Table 1.1 - Changes in market income inequality


















West Germany 1983-90 +
Italy 1977-91 -
Designation: Interpretation: Range of change in Gini
- small decline -5% or more
0 zero -4% to +4%
+ small increase 5% to 10%
++ moderate increase 10% to 15%
+++ large increase 16% to 29%
Source: Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), table 4, page 666
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Table 2.1 - Gender distribution of hourly earnings 
Income Income
Class %obs tot% %obs tot% Class %obs tot% %obs tot%
5.2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.24 0.5% 94.1% 0.9% 88.5%
5.24 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.28 0.5% 94.6% 0.9% 89.4%
5.28 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.32 0.5% 95.0% 0.8% 90.2%
5.32 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 7.36 0.4% 95.5% 0.8% 91.0%
5.36 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 7.4 0.4% 95.9% 0.8% 91.8%
5.4 0.3% 0.6% 0.2% 0.4% 7.44 0.4% 96.3% 0.7% 92.5%
5.44 0.3% 0.9% 0.2% 0.6% 7.48 0.3% 96.6% 0.5% 93.0%
5.48 0.3% 1.2% 0.2% 0.8% 7.52 0.3% 96.9% 0.5% 93.5%
5.52 0.3% 1.5% 0.2% 1.0% 7.56 0.2% 97.1% 0.5% 94.1%
5.56 0.5% 2.1% 0.3% 1.3% 7.6 0.3% 97.4% 0.4% 94.5%
5.6 0.8% 2.8% 0.5% 1.8% 7.64 0.2% 97.6% 0.5% 95.0%
5.64 3.5% 6.4% 1.9% 3.7% 7.68 0.2% 97.8% 0.4% 95.3%
5.68 3.2% 9.6% 1.5% 5.2% 7.72 0.2% 98.1% 0.4% 95.7%
5.72 5.1% 14.7% 2.0% 7.2% 7.76 0.2% 98.3% 0.4% 96.1%
5.76 3.6% 18.3% 1.7% 8.9% 7.8 0.2% 98.4% 0.3% 96.4%
5.8 4.5% 22.8% 2.0% 10.9% 7.84 0.1% 98.5% 0.3% 96.7%
5.84 5.7% 28.5% 1.9% 12.8% 7.88 0.2% 98.7% 0.3% 97.0%
5.88 5.7% 34.2% 2.5% 15.3% 7.92 0.1% 98.8% 0.2% 97.2%
5.92 5.6% 39.8% 2.3% 17.6% 7.96 0.2% 99.0% 0.3% 97.5%
5.96 4.2% 44.0% 2.8% 20.4% 8 0.1% 99.2% 0.2% 97.8%
6 3.5% 47.5% 3.0% 23.4% 8.04 0.1% 99.3% 0.3% 98.0%
6.04 3.5% 51.1% 3.3% 26.7% 8.08 0.1% 99.4% 0.2% 98.2%
6.08 3.2% 54.3% 3.1% 29.8% 8.12 0.0% 99.4% 0.2% 98.4%
6.12 3.0% 57.2% 3.0% 32.8% 8.16 0.1% 99.5% 0.1% 98.6%
6.16 2.9% 60.1% 3.2% 36.0% 8.2 0.1% 99.5% 0.2% 98.7%
6.2 2.7% 62.8% 4.1% 40.1% 8.24 0.0% 99.6% 0.1% 98.9%
6.24 2.6% 65.4% 3.3% 43.4% 8.28 0.0% 99.6% 0.1% 99.0%
6.28 2.6% 68.0% 3.2% 46.6% 8.32 0.0% 99.6% 0.1% 99.1%
6.32 2.2% 70.2% 2.8% 49.5% 8.36 0.1% 99.7% 0.1% 99.2%
6.36 2.0% 72.1% 2.7% 52.2% 8.4 0.0% 99.7% 0.1% 99.3%
6.4 2.1% 74.2% 2.4% 54.6% 8.44 0.0% 99.8% 0.1% 99.4%
6.44 1.6% 75.8% 2.6% 57.1% 8.48 0.0% 99.8% 0.1% 99.5%
6.48 1.4% 77.3% 2.3% 59.4% 8.52 0.0% 99.8% 0.1% 99.5%
6.52 1.4% 78.7% 2.2% 61.6% 8.56 0.0% 99.8% 0.1% 99.6%
6.56 1.5% 80.2% 2.1% 63.7% 8.6 0.0% 99.9% 0.0% 99.6%
6.6 1.1% 81.3% 1.9% 65.6% 8.64 0.0% 99.9% 0.0% 99.7%
6.64 1.2% 82.5% 1.9% 67.4% 8.68 0.0% 99.9% 0.0% 99.7%
6.68 1.1% 83.6% 1.9% 69.3% 8.72 0.0% 99.9% 0.0% 99.7%
6.72 1.0% 84.6% 1.8% 71.1% 8.76 0.0% 99.9% 0.1% 99.8%
6.76 0.9% 85.5% 1.7% 72.8% 8.8 0.0% 99.9% 0.0% 99.8%
6.8 0.9% 86.3% 1.8% 74.6% 8.84 0.0% 99.9% 0.0% 99.8%
6.84 0.8% 87.1% 1.4% 76.0% 8.88 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.9%
6.88 0.6% 87.7% 1.4% 77.5% 8.92 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.9%
6.92 0.8% 88.5% 1.4% 78.8% 8.96 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.9%
6.96 0.9% 89.4% 1.4% 80.3% 9 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.9%
7 0.7% 90.1% 1.4% 81.7% 9.04 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.9%
7.04 0.7% 90.8% 1.3% 83.0% 9.08 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.9%
7.08 0.7% 91.6% 1.2% 84.1% 9.12 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 99.9%
7.12 0.7% 92.3% 1.2% 85.4% 9.16 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0%
7.16 0.6% 92.9% 1.1% 86.4% 9.2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0%
7.2 0.7% 93.5% 1.1% 87.6%
Notes: Right tail of the distribution not described
Bold and underlined: modal class; Italics: classes associated
with each decile












Graph 2.1 - Distribution of log hourly earnings, 
Portugal, 1995, Men and Women
Women Men
Table 2.2 - Comparison between OLS and Quantile Regressions - Application to gender wage differentials
income total diff. female
classes hwage stdev c.var. (1) nobs hwage stdev c.var. nobs (2) dummy (3)
1 5.655 0.101 0.018 2799 5.596 0.085 0.015 1882 -0.058 -0.099
2 5.875 0.049 0.008 2791 5.727 0.028 0.005 1880 -0.148 -0.177
3 6.019 0.036 0.006 2794 5.816 0.021 0.004 1883 -0.203 -0.232
4 6.144 0.034 0.005 2795 5.887 0.021 0.004 1878 -0.258 -0.277
5 6.260 0.037 0.006 2794 5.973 0.031 0.005 1880 -0.288 -0.300
6 6.406 0.047 0.007 2795 6.090 0.037 0.006 1881 -0.316 -0.332
7 6.589 0.060 0.009 2796 6.235 0.045 0.007 1881 -0.354 -0.377
8 6.817 0.075 0.011 2793 6.426 0.069 0.011 1880 -0.390 -0.397
9 7.115 0.102 0.014 2795 6.753 0.128 0.019 1881 -0.362 -0.315
10 7.747 0.381 0.049 2794 7.424 0.380 0.051 1880 -0.323
All (4) 6.463 0.612 0.09 27946 6.193 0.542 0.09 18806 -0.270 -0.270
Notes:
(1) - Coefficient of variation (ratio between standard deviation and mean)
(2) - Difference between women's and men's hourly wage.
(3) - Coefficient obtained in quantile regression (OLS for last row) for 1st, 2nd, …, 9th deciles
(4) - All individuals (no income classes)
Legend: hwage - mean log hourly wage; stdev - standard deviation; nobs - number of observations.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 1995 sample.
men women

Table 4.1a - Data-sets description
Country Data-set Description Years Obs. Outliers cleaning procedure (1)
Austria Mikrozensus 1% Household Survey 1981 9889 Employees with wages below minimum
(net wages) 1985 8120 Social Security contribution level 
1989 7878 (US$ 320 at 1993 level)
1993 7175 Employees below 15 or above 65 years
Denmark LLMR Longitudinal Labour Market 1980 4099 None
 Register (0.5% sample) 1985 4212
1990 4352
1995 4416
Finland Labour Force Cross-section labour 1987 1888 Extremely high and low earners
Survey  force survey 1989 2089 Zero earnings and zero hours
1993 1175
France FQP Cross-section household 1970 15297 Wages below minimum wage and 







Greece EOP Household Budget Survey 1974 2267 Zero earning and zero hours, more than
(net wages) 1988 1860 84 hours per week, aged below 14 or
1994 2096 above 64, primary sector
Ireland ESRI Cross-section household data 1987 1895
1994 1903
Italy SHIW Cross-section household- 1980 1730 Observations without earnings
based dataset 1984 2200 (missing or equal to zero)
1989 4114
1995 3441
Notes: (1) - Observations which were dropped
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Table 4.1b - Data-sets description
Country Data-set Description Years Obs. Outliers cleaning procedure (1)
Netherlands Structure of earnings Cross-section employer- 1979 40726 Unknown (Statistical agency's 
survey based dataset 1989 12555 responsibility)
1996 49805
Norway Level of living survey 1983 1037 Earnings below 20 NOK and
1987 970 above 1000 NOK
1991 901
1995 870
Portugal Quadros Cross-section employer- 1982 27019 Zero earning and zero hours
de Pessoal based data-set 1986 26595
1991 27952
1995 28055
Spain Household Budget S. 1990 9714
ECHP 1994 2181
Wage Structure S. 1995 118005
Sweden Swedish Level Cross-sectional data 1981 1658 Zero earnings
of Living Surveys (representative of Swedes) 1991 1508
Switzerland Swiss Labour Cross section of the adult 1992 3388 0.5% at the bottom and the top
Force Survey population permantently residen 1995 6334 of the wage distribution
in Switzerland 1998 3275
UK Family Expenditures Longitudinal household survey 1980 2883 Zero earnings and zero hours
Survey focused on expenditures 1985 2526 Hourly earnings below 1 GBP
1990 2425
1995 2183
Notes: (1) - Observations which were dropped
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Table 4.2 - Time span covered by each country's results
1974 75 76 77 78 79 1980 81 82 83 84 1985 86 87 88 89 1990 91 92 93 94 1995 96 97 98
Austria X X X X
Denmark X X X X
Finland X X X
France (1) X X X
Germany X X X X
Greece X X X
Italy X X X X
Ireland X X
Netherlands X X X
Norway X X X X
Portugal X X X X
Spain X X X
Sweden X X
Switzerland X X X
UK X X X X
Legend: X indicates year for each results are presented; the shaded area marks the time-span covered
Notes: (1) Results for France include also 1970.
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Table 4.3a - Descriptive statistics
Country Years Educ. (1) Exp. (2) Mean St.Dev. 1st dec. 5th dec. 9th dec.
Austria 1981 9.5 22.2 3.99 0.34 37.5 50.0 81.3
1985 9.7 21.4 4.16 0.34 43.7 62.5 97.5
1989 9.8 21.3 4.35 0.34 52.6 75.0 118.7
1993 10.1 21.3 4.57 0.35 65.8 93.8 150.0
Denmark 1980 11.5 18.6 4.42 0.34 59.1 80.7 127.1
1985 11.7 18.9 4.62 0.33 71.5 97.5 151.4
1990 11.9 19.2 4.92 0.35 94.6 131.6 214.9
1995 12.0 19.4 4.97 0.36 96.5 138.4 230.4
Finland 1987 11.0 17.7 3.81 0.37 29.9 43.6 73.7
1989 11.1 18.4 4.02 0.37 36.1 53.8 90.9
1993 11.4 19.5 4.16 0.38 41.9 62.1 106.1
France (4) 1970 9.8 21.8 10.61 0.46 13.2 21.6 45.1
1977 10.5 20.2 10.87 0.42 17.9 28.8 53.8
1985 11.3 19.1 10.91 0.39 19.2 29.7 53.7
1993 11.4 21.9 10.92 0.39 19.8 29.8 54.1
Germany
Greece 1974 7.82 23.41 3.57 0.55
1988 9.89 21.55 6.11 0.47
1994 10.14 21.87 6.93 0.64
Ireland 1987 11.5 20.4 1.48 0.52 2.2 4.4 8.3
1994 12.4 23.8 1.74 0.61 2.5 5.9 11.9
Italy 1980 8.8 24.3 1.24 0.42 2.2 3.6 5.2
1984 9.2 23.6 1.84 0.39 4.4 6.5 9.4
1989 9.8 22.9 2.26 0.32 6.5 9.4 13.9
1995 10.1 22.9 2.52 0.41 7.8 12.5 20.8
Log Wage (3) Wage
Table 4.3b - Descriptive statistics
Country Years Educ. (1) Exp. (2) Mean St.Dev. 1st dec. 5th dec. 9th dec.
Netherlands 1979 11.5 20.3 2.88 0.43 11.4 16.4 33.7
1989 11.7 19.6 3.01 0.37 13.8 19.6 32.9
1996 12.5 20.0 3.23 0.46 15.5 24.9 43.8
Norway 1983 11.2 21.3 3.96 0.30 37.9 51.7 78.2
1987 11.5 19.8 4.31 0.32 51.4 73.6 109.2
1991 11.9 21.8 4.53 0.30 68.4 92.0 136.2
1995 12.2 20.9 4.65 0.33 71.4 101.1 158.0
Portugal 1982 4.9 25.1 4.58 0.52 56 92 194
1986 5.3 26.0 5.35 0.56 118 191 471
1991 5.9 25.3 6.06 0.59 228 379 979
1995 6.5 24.5 6.42 0.61 318 531 1456
Spain (5) 1990 7.3 25.0 14.37 0.46 555.8 924.6 1809.8
1994 9.8 24.8 7.61 0.49 1104.5 1955.5 3813.6
1995 8.8 26.0 7.30 0.52 761.0 1410.3 2998.6
Sweden 1981 10.7 21.7 3.67 0.30 29.0 37.0 57.0
1991 11.8 21.5 4.45 0.31 61.0 81.0 127.0
Switzerland 1992 13.1 19.3 3.57 0.39 23.1 34.4 58.1
1995 13.2 19.8 3.60 0.40 23.9 35.9 60.3
1998 13.3 20.3 3.63 0.38 25.1 36.8 60.8
UK 1980 11.0 24.8 1.79 0.40 3.8 5.9 9.8
1985 11.4 23.8 1.87 0.44 3.9 6.3 11.2
1990 11.9 23.1 1.98 0.48 4.1 7.1 13.0
1995 12.3 22.6 2.00 0.49 4.1 7.3 13.5
Notes: (1) - Average education years in each sample (2) - Average years of experience
(3) - For all countries except Austria, Italy and Greece the dependent variable was log gross wages.
(4) - Log Wages refer to yearly earnings. Wages refer to hourly wages (assuming 1760 hours worked per year). All 
results are in 1980 francs.
(5) - Results for 1990 are based in yearly earnings. Hourly wages for that year were computed assuming 1760 hours
worked per year.
Log Wage (3) Wage
Table 4.4a - Inequality computations
Log Wage
Country Years 9/1 9/5 5/1 Diff. (2)
Austria 1981 2.17 1.63 1.33 0.77
1985 2.23 1.56 1.43 0.80
1989 2.26 1.58 1.43 0.81
1993 2.28 1.60 1.43 0.82
Denmark 1980 2.15 1.57 1.37 0.77
1985 2.12 1.55 1.36 0.75
1990 2.27 1.63 1.39 0.82
1995 2.39 1.67 1.43 0.87
Finland 1987 2.47 1.69 1.46 0.90
1989 2.52 1.69 1.49 0.92
1993 2.53 1.71 1.48 0.93
France 1970 3.42 2.09 1.64 1.23
1977 3.01 1.87 1.61 1.10
1985 2.80 1.81 1.55 1.03
1993 2.73 1.81 1.50 1.00
Germany
Greece
Ireland 1987 3.68 1.86 1.98 0.57
1994 4.74 2.01 2.36 0.68
Italy 1980 2.38 1.43 1.67 0.87
1984 2.12 1.44 1.47 0.75
1989 2.13 1.48 1.44 0.76
1995 2.67 1.67 1.60 0.98
Wage Ratios (1)
Table 4.4b - Inequality computations
Log Wage
Country Years 9/1 9/5 5/1 Diff. (2)
Netherlands 1979 2.96 2.06 1.44 0.47
1989 2.38 1.68 1.42 0.38
1996 2.83 1.75 1.61 0.45
Norway 1983 2.06 1.51 1.36 0.72
1987 2.12 1.48 1.43 0.75
1991 1.99 1.48 1.34 0.69
1995 2.21 1.56 1.42 0.79
Portugal 1982 3.46 2.12 1.63 1.24
1986 3.99 2.46 1.62 1.38
1991 4.30 2.58 1.66 1.46
1995 4.58 2.74 1.67 1.52
Spain 1990 3.26 1.96 1.66 1.18
1994 3.45 1.95 1.77 1.24
1995 3.94 2.13 1.85 1.37
Sweden 1981 1.97 1.54 1.28 0.68
1991 2.08 1.57 1.33 0.73
Switzerland 1992 2.51 1.69 1.49 0.92
1995 2.53 1.68 1.51 0.93
1998 2.42 1.65 1.46 0.88
UK 1980 2.58 1.66 1.56 0.95
1985 2.86 1.77 1.61 1.05
1990 3.17 1.84 1.73 1.16
1995 3.33 1.85 1.80 1.20
Notes:
(1) - Ratio of Wages corresponding to different deciles (1st, 5th and 9
(2) - Difference of Log Wages between 9th and 1st deciles
Wage Ratios (1)
Graph 5.1 - Returns to Education in Austria, 1981-1993 
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Graph 5.2 - Return to Education in Denmark, 1980-1995
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Graph 5.3 - Returns to Education in Finland, 1987-1993 




























Graph 5.4 - Returns to Education in France, 1970-1993 
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Graph 5.6 - Returns to Education in Greece, 1974-1994














Graph 5.7 - Returns to Education in Ireland, 1987-1994 



























Graph 5.8 - Returns to Education in Italy, 1980-1995, 
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Graph 5.9 - Returns to Education in the Netherlands, 1979-1996 































Graph 5.10 - Returns to Education in Norway, 1983-1995 
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Graph 5.11 - Returns to Education in Portugal, 1982-1995 
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Graph 5.12 - Returns to Education in Spain, 1990-1995 
































Graph 5.13 - Returns to Education in Sweden, 1981-1991 




























Graph 5.14 - Returns to Education in Switzerland, 1992-1998




























Graph 5.15 - Returns to Education in the UK, 1980-1995
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Table 5.1 - Quantile regressions results (coefficients and SE's)
0,1 0,088 0,0048 0,080 0,0032 0,078 0,0047 0,070 0,0034
0,2 0,086 0,0030 0,086 0,0027 0,086 0,0029 0,075 0,0030
0,3 0,095 0,0023 0,088 0,0035 0,091 0,0029 0,082 0,0020
0,4 0,097 0,0035 0,093 0,0023 0,095 0,0020 0,087 0,0028
0,5 0,101 0,0034 0,095 0,0024 0,097 0,0022 0,091 0,0031
0,6 0,104 0,0039 0,098 0,0025 0,100 0,0022 0,098 0,0034
0,7 0,110 0,0050 0,102 0,0029 0,101 0,0031 0,106 0,0042
0,8 0,115 0,0042 0,103 0,0042 0,105 0,0030 0,113 0,0031
0,9 0,118 0,0047 0,114 0,0039 0,113 0,0049 0,120 0,0046
OLS 0,100 0,0019 0,095 0,0020 0,095 0,0023 0,093 0,0021
0,1 0,046 0,0021 0,041 0,0023 0,047 0,0023 0,061 0,0026
0,2 0,043 0,0021 0,040 0,0019 0,048 0,0018 0,062 0,0020
0,3 0,045 0,0017 0,042 0,0016 0,049 0,0017 0,061 0,0016
0,4 0,044 0,0016 0,044 0,0018 0,051 0,0021 0,061 0,0017
0,5 0,047 0,0015 0,047 0,0020 0,054 0,0021 0,061 0,0021
0,6 0,048 0,0023 0,050 0,0019 0,056 0,0023 0,065 0,0019
0,7 0,047 0,0022 0,054 0,0023 0,059 0,0027 0,067 0,0024
0,8 0,050 0,0031 0,057 0,0031 0,060 0,0032 0,069 0,0024
0,9 0,051 0,0049 0,064 0,0035 0,062 0,0043 0,069 0,0041
OLS 0,045 0,0020 0,051 0,0018 0,055 0,0019 0,064 0,0018
0,1 0,070 0,0061 0,083 0,0061 0,066 0,0067
0,2 0,083 0,0046 0,086 0,0033 0,083 0,0048
0,3 0,087 0,0042 0,086 0,0038 0,080 0,0052
0,4 0,090 0,0036 0,094 0,0043 0,081 0,0042
0,5 0,095 0,0040 0,097 0,0032 0,088 0,0045
0,6 0,097 0,0043 0,094 0,0047 0,087 0,0050
0,7 0,097 0,0047 0,093 0,0043 0,092 0,0048
0,8 0,096 0,0056 0,089 0,0056 0,092 0,0062
0,9 0,098 0,0082 0,094 0,0081 0,096 0,0096
OLS 0,091 0,0037 0,090 0,0035 0,086 0,0042
0,1 0,0680 0,00155 0,0549 0,00207 0,0588 0,00149 0,0571 0,00203
0,2 0,0789 0,00135 0,0678 0,00125 0,0675 0,00129 0,0652 0,00197
0,3 0,0855 0,00133 0,0759 0,00122 0,0734 0,00097 0,0682 0,00183
0,4 0,0929 0,00128 0,0794 0,00100 0,0763 0,00107 0,0728 0,00188
0,5 0,0968 0,00129 0,0827 0,00106 0,0786 0,00117 0,0755 0,00174
0,6 0,0997 0,00115 0,0850 0,00111 0,0804 0,00108 0,0809 0,00210
0,7 0,1021 0,00131 0,0886 0,00111 0,0828 0,00119 0,0825 0,00216
0,8 0,1025 0,00133 0,0919 0,00123 0,0835 0,00141 0,0840 0,00290
0,9 0,1005 0,00183 0,0938 0,00150 0,0835 0,00157 0,0890 0,00345






1981 1985 1989 1993
1995
1987 1989 1993
1970 1977 1985 1993
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Table 5.1 - Quantile regressions results (cont.)
0.1 0.090 0.0043 0.096 0.0059 0.087 0.0044 0.082 0.0045
0.2 0.089 0.0030 0.092 0.0030 0.086 0.0038 0.077 0.0053
0.3 0.087 0.0034 0.090 0.0035 0.084 0.0035 0.073 0.0032
0.4 0.084 0.0033 0.085 0.0037 0.080 0.0042 0.074 0.0033
0.5 0.083 0.0036 0.080 0.0036 0.079 0.0047 0.076 0.0033
0.6 0.083 0.0035 0.082 0.0027 0.080 0.0030 0.078 0.0032
0.7 0.084 0.0024 0.084 0.0040 0.076 0.0034 0.077 0.0030
0.8 0.084 0.0044 0.090 0.0053 0.077 0.0059 0.075 0.0037
0.9 0.081 0.0057 0.092 0.0075 0.074 0.0034 0.072 0.0044
0.1 0.063 0.0031 0.049 0.0043 0.073 0.0072
0.2 0.058 0.0024 0.044 0.0032 0.063 0.0043
0.3 0.058 0.0022 0.047 0.0025 0.060 0.0041
0.4 0.058 0.0023 0.045 0.0023 0.059 0.0028
0.5 0.054 0.0024 0.044 0.0020 0.056 0.0027
0.6 0.052 0.0030 0.044 0.0020 0.056 0.0028
0.7 0.056 0.0036 0.045 0.0027 0.055 0.0029
0.8 0.057 0.0042 0.047 0.0034 0.053 0.0034
0.9 0.053 0.0050 0.047 0.0042 0.055 0.0047
OLS 0.057 0.0024 0.050 0.0027 0.063 0.0033
0.1 0.096 0.0089 0.075 0.0102
0.2 0.086 0.0083 0.085 0.0056
0.3 0.087 0.0066 0.087 0.0048
0.4 0.102 0.0049 0.089 0.0040
0.5 0.105 0.0060 0.099 0.0052
0.6 0.105 0.0057 0.098 0.0055
0.7 0.103 0.0055 0.100 0.0044
0.8 0.104 0.0073 0.102 0.0032
0.9 0.099 0.0087 0.099 0.0049
OLS 0.097 0.0053 0.086 0.0047
0.1 0.039 0.0052 0.043 0.0037 0.039 0.0021 0.065 0.0034
0.2 0.033 0.0035 0.036 0.0026 0.037 0.0017 0.063 0.0024
0.3 0.034 0.0018 0.037 0.0020 0.037 0.0014 0.057 0.0021
0.4 0.034 0.0025 0.035 0.0019 0.040 0.0016 0.057 0.0017
0.5 0.034 0.0018 0.036 0.0019 0.040 0.0018 0.056 0.0015
0.6 0.035 0.0078 0.035 0.0014 0.041 0.0018 0.057 0.0019
0.7 0.035 0.0017 0.037 0.0022 0.041 0.0014 0.061 0.0020
0.8 0.039 0.0022 0.041 0.0021 0.045 0.0020 0.065 0.0026
0.9 0.045 0.0036 0.042 0.0033 0.049 0.0027 0.068 0.0033













Table 5.1 - Quantile regressions results (cont.)
0.1 0.063 0.0006 0.046 0.0011 0.051 0.0014
0.2 0.071 0.0007 0.053 0.0008 0.054 0.0008
0.3 0.076 0.0008 0.055 0.0008 0.059 0.0008
0.4 0.078 0.0008 0.059 0.0009 0.061 0.0007
0.5 0.082 0.0008 0.062 0.0009 0.063 0.0007
0.6 0.085 0.0010 0.067 0.0011 0.066 0.0008
0.7 0.088 0.0009 0.070 0.0012 0.070 0.0008
0.8 0.088 0.0011 0.074 0.0014 0.074 0.0010
0.9 0.088 0.0013 0.078 0.0021 0.079 0.0013
OLS 0.083 0.0004 0.066 0.0008 0.068 0.0006
0.1 0.052 0.0049 0.035 0.0062 0.058 0.0070 0.053 0.0071
0.2 0.049 0.0033 0.040 0.0042 0.046 0.0043 0.048 0.0043
0.3 0.052 0.0031 0.042 0.0037 0.048 0.0031 0.051 0.0042
0.4 0.051 0.0034 0.045 0.0044 0.045 0.0028 0.049 0.0025
0.5 0.056 0.0032 0.046 0.0041 0.046 0.0028 0.056 0.0039
0.6 0.057 0.0032 0.051 0.0037 0.048 0.0036 0.065 0.0044
0.7 0.059 0.0037 0.056 0.0038 0.058 0.0043 0.069 0.0060
0.8 0.064 0.0037 0.052 0.0050 0.060 0.0039 0.070 0.0049
0.9 0.061 0.0064 0.051 0.0060 0.052 0.0071 0.073 0.0080
OLS 0.056 0.0030 0.045 0.0035 0.054 0.0035 0.059 0.0039
0.1 0.083 0.0012 0.085 0.0012 0.074 0.0009 0.065 0.0010
0.2 0.092 0.0010 0.093 0.0009 0.094 0.0008 0.083 0.0010
0.3 0.097 0.0009 0.101 0.0010 0.106 0.0009 0.099 0.0009
0.4 0.101 0.0009 0.110 0.0009 0.116 0.0009 0.112 0.0009
0.5 0.105 0.0010 0.118 0.0011 0.122 0.0009 0.122 0.0009
0.6 0.109 0.0011 0.125 0.0010 0.127 0.0009 0.131 0.0011
0.7 0.111 0.0011 0.130 0.0012 0.132 0.0011 0.136 0.0012
0.8 0.113 0.0013 0.134 0.0012 0.136 0.0013 0.140 0.0013
0.9 0.117 0.0016 0.136 0.0019 0.142 0.0017 0.145 0.0017
OLS 0.104 0.0009 0.115 0.0009 0.117 0.0009 0.119 0.0009
0.1 0.062 0.0013 0.058 0.0028 0.065 0.0004
0.2 0.069 0.0011 0.071 0.0030 0.076 0.0004
0.3 0.069 0.0012 0.077 0.0029 0.083 0.0004
0.4 0.069 0.0011 0.081 0.0032 0.086 0.0004
0.5 0.070 0.0009 0.082 0.0026 0.087 0.0004
0.6 0.071 0.0012 0.081 0.0032 0.087 0.0004
0.7 0.072 0.0013 0.080 0.0040 0.087 0.0004
0.8 0.074 0.0014 0.080 0.0042 0.087 0.0005
0.9 0.080 0.0019 0.078 0.0040 0.087 0.0006
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Portugal




Table 5.1 - Quantile regressions results (cont.)
0,1 0,032 0,0024 0,024 0,0027
0,2 0,035 0,0016 0,028 0,0021
0,3 0,037 0,0018 0,031 0,0022
0,4 0,040 0,0017 0,036 0,0023
0,5 0,044 0,0016 0,043 0,0026
0,6 0,047 0,0020 0,045 0,0025
0,7 0,051 0,0023 0,050 0,0029
0,8 0,059 0,0030 0,055 0,0036
0,9 0,063 0,0041 0,060 0,0044
OLS 0,046 0,0020 0,041 0,0022
0,1 0,079 0,0050 0,084 0,0036 0,061 0,0037
0,2 0,085 0,0033 0,084 0,0024 0,076 0,0030
0,3 0,092 0,0028 0,086 0,0022 0,081 0,0022
0,4 0,092 0,0029 0,090 0,0016 0,082 0,0025
0,5 0,092 0,0023 0,092 0,0014 0,084 0,0025
0,6 0,092 0,0025 0,094 0,0018 0,087 0,0023
0,7 0,095 0,0028 0,096 0,0016 0,090 0,0028
0,8 0,100 0,0025 0,100 0,0020 0,091 0,0030
0,9 0,102 0,0046 0,101 0,0026 0,097 0,0036
OLS 0,091 0,0026 0,090 0,0019 0,086 0,0024
0,1 0,024 0,0049 0,053 0,0054 0,055 0,0067 0,048 0,0070
0,2 0,039 0,0041 0,050 0,0046 0,060 0,0047 0,056 0,0056
0,3 0,051 0,0042 0,060 0,0041 0,067 0,0051 0,066 0,0053
0,4 0,056 0,0034 0,066 0,0036 0,070 0,0049 0,071 0,0047
0,5 0,061 0,0036 0,066 0,0046 0,072 0,0051 0,070 0,0042
0,6 0,058 0,0031 0,070 0,0034 0,072 0,0038 0,070 0,0036
0,7 0,062 0,0039 0,073 0,0040 0,069 0,0037 0,069 0,0040
0,8 0,071 0,0039 0,077 0,0051 0,082 0,0043 0,075 0,0049
0,9 0,071 0,0058 0,075 0,0047 0,087 0,0053 0,092 0,0060
OLS 0,065 0,0034 0,078 0,0038 0,083 0,0039 0,083 0,0041
United Kingdom






Table 5.2 - Summary of results
Country Years 1st dec. 9th dec. OLS
Austria 1981 9.2% 12.6% 10.5%
1993 7.2% 12.8% 9.7%
Denmark 1980 4.7% 5.3% 4.6%
1995 6.3% 7.1% 6.6%
Finland 1987 7.3% 10.3% 9.5%
1993 6.8% 10.1% 8.9%
France 1977 5.6% 9.8% 7.5%
1993 5.9% 9.3% 7.6%
Germany 1984 9.4% 8.4%
1995 8.5% 7.5%
Greece 1974 6.5% 5.4% 5.8%
1994 7.5% 5.6% 6.5%
Italy 1980 3.9% 4.6% 4.3%
1995 6.7% 7.1% 6.4%
Ireland 1987 10.1% 10.4% 10.2%
1994 7.8% 10.4% 8.9%
Netherlands 1979 6.5% 9.2% 8.6%
1996 5.3% 8.3% 7.0%
Norway 1983 5.3% 6.3% 5.7%
1995 5.5% 7.5% 6.0%
Portugal 1982 8.7% 12.4% 11.0%
1995 6.7% 15.6% 12.6%
Spain 1990 6.4% 8.3% 7.2%
1995 6.7% 9.1% 8.6%
Sweden 1981 3.2% 6.6% 4.7%
1991 2.4% 6.2% 4.1%
Switzerland 1992 8.2% 10.7% 9.6%
1998 6.3% 10.2% 9.0%
UK 1980 2.5% 7.4% 6.7%
1995 4.9% 9.7% 8.6%
Means First Year 6.3% 8.5% 7.6%
St. Dev. 2.3% 2.6% 2.3%
Coeff. Var. 0.36 0.31 0.31
Means Last year 6.1% 9.2% 7.9%
St. Dev. 1.4% 2.7% 2.0%
Coeff. Var. 0.22 0.29 0.26
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Table 5.3 - Comparisons of results at 1980 and 1995
OLS(95)- Q(.1|95)- Q(.9|95)- Q(.9|80)- Q(.9|95)-
-OLS(80) -Q(.1|80) -Q(.9|80) -Q(.1|80) -Q(.1|95)
Austria -0.7% -2.0% 0.2% 3.4% 5.6%
Denmark 2.0% 1.6% 1.9% 0.6% 0.8%
Finland -0.6% -0.5% -0.2% 3.0% 3.3%
France 0.1% 0.2% -0.5% 4.2% 3.4%
Germany -0.9% -0.9% -1.0% -1.0%
Greece 0.7% 1.0% 0.2% -1.1% -1.9%
Italy 2.1% 2.8% 2.5% 0.6% 0.4%
Ireland -1.3% -2.3% 0.0% 0.3% 2.6%
Netherlands -1.6% -1.3% -0.9% 2.6% 3.0%
Norway 0.3% 0.2% 1.2% 1.0% 2.1%
Portugal 1.6% -2.0% 3.2% 3.7% 8.9%
Spain 1.3% 0.3% 0.8% 2.0% 2.4%
Sweden -0.6% -0.8% -0.4% 3.3% 3.8%
Switzerland -0.5% -1.8% -0.4% 2.5% 3.9%
UK 1.9% 2.4% 2.3% 4.9% 4.8%
Table 5.4 - Country types

















(1) - Relationship between returns and wage distributio
(2) - Yes if the curve has become steeper.
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Graph 5.16 - Returns to Education in Europe, Men
OLS Regressions
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